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Abstract—There is immense interest worldwide in the notion of
universal health coverage (UHC). A major policy focus in moving
toward UHC has been on the key policy question: what services
should be made available and under what conditions? In this article
we are concerned with how a feasible set of UHC services can be
explicitly defined to create what is commonly known as a “health
benefits package” (HBP), a set of services that can be feasibly
financed and provided under the actual circumstances in which a
given country finds itself. We explain why an explicit statement of
the HBP is important and then describe a framework that includes
ten core elements that are indispensable if a coherent and
sustainable process for setting the HBP is to be established.
INTRODUCTION
Universal Health Coverage
There is immense interest worldwide in the notion of univer-
sal health coverage (UHC), culminating in the publication of
the World Health Report 20101 and given further momentum
by the 2014 adoption of the United Nations General Assem-
bly Resolution on UHC. UHC is defined by the World Health
Organization as “ensuring that all people can use the promo-
tive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health
services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while
also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose
the user to financial hardship.”2 In practice, UHC aims to
assure the delivery of certain health services or products free
of charge, or at a subsidized fee, to the entire population.
The interest in moving toward UHC is easy to understand.
Done well, UHC improves access to health services for
many people who would otherwise be unable to use those
services and can improve the use of services designed to pre-
vent future ill health.3 UHC can reduce the incidence of
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serious impoverishment caused by health shocks. In addition,
by making access to health services unrelated to ability to
pay, UHC satisfies a widely held concept of fairness.4 Fur-
ther, as well as promoting financial security, progress toward
UHC can improve health outcomes for the population.5 A
fairly comprehensive form of UHC has been in place in most
high-income countries for several decades, and an increasing
number of low- and middle-income countries are seeking to
make a transition toward UHC.
A central requirement of any system of UHC is that the
services made available to the population are consistent with
the funds available. This article argues that the creation of an
explicit health benefits package is an essential element in cre-
ating a sustainable system of UHC. The purpose of the article
is then to describe the functions needed to fulfill that require-
ment, in what we term a framework for setting the package.
In the remainder of this section, we set out the salient fea-
tures of the health system needed to implement UHC and
explain why an explicit package is necessary. We then
describe the framework, which includes ten core elements,
and conclude with some brief observations on
implementation.
While the need and rationale for a health benefits package
has been made in general terms elsewhere, this article adds
value to the literature by linking the need for a health benefits
package to the UHC mandate and discussion, and by focus-
ing on the practical steps and country experience needed to
make a health benefits package an effective policy tool for
delivering better health and health care.
The UHC Funding Pool
UHC requires the establishment or expansion of a pool of
finance with which to fund the health services to be made
available. Whatever the precise source of such finance, in
order to maintain the principle of UHC, it is essential that a
citizen’s financial contributions are mandatory and that they
are unrelated to the medical circumstances or risks of the
individual.6 If these basic requirements are not met, then
both economic theory and practical experience show that the
health insurance mechanism breaks down, or progress toward
UHC stagnates.7 A defining feature of UHC is therefore its
reliance on public finance, in the form of taxation or pseudo-
taxation, such as social health insurance. In most systems
that have adopted UHC, financial contributions are related to
ability to pay and so have the effect of ensuring that healthy
and wealthy people to some extent cross-subsidize the health
service utilization of poor and sick people.
A serious limiting factor in any progress toward UHC is
the size of the funding pool that a country is willing and able
to make available for the needed medical services. High-
income countries have by and large been able to claim that
the funds they have available enable them to cover most
mainstream medical services. Even in high-income countries,
however, there are increasing debates about the ability to
subsidize certain high-cost drug therapies and more general
concerns about the future sustainability of existing systems.
This trend reflects more general long-standing debates about
rationing health services.8 Such debates are in many ways
similar to those in low-income settings of prioritizing only a
limited number of treatments for public funding. Though the
nature of the binding constraints facing low-income settings
is much more dramatic (low-income countries spent 35 USD
[average exchange rate] per capita on health on average ver-
sus 4,692 USD in high income countries in 20139), the politi-
cal economy of different interest and patient groups seeking
to expand coverage without regard to resource constraints
and trade-offs is broadly similar.
To some extent, the effective size of the funding pool can
be enlarged by expanding the scope of the taxation base and
improving the efficiency with which services are delivered.
However, no country can possibly offer access to all avail-
able medical treatments. Serious questions therefore need to
be addressed on how best to use the limited funds available,
especially in low- and middle-income countries. Thus, in
making a transition toward UHC, three fundamental policy
questions arise: what services should be available under
UHC, to whom should they be made available, and what (if
any) user charges or other arrangements should be attached
to services that are not considered priorities given current
circumstances?
In practice, the imposition of user charges, even if they
are below market prices, is bureaucratically complex and
can frustrate the objectives of UHC if poorly designed.10
Likewise, restriction of UHC or charging differential pri-
ces to different socioeconomic groups or certain subsets
of the population can be ethically and administratively
questionable. In many countries, for example, the admin-
istrative expense related to the collection of user charges
can be greater than the sum of the charges themselves,
defeating the purpose of expanded revenue collection.
Further, the practice of excluding informal sector workers
with some ability to pay from public health care subsidies
has been largely unsuccessful.11 There have been some
arguments that UHC might be limited to certain disadvan-
taged groups, such as poor households,12 and several of
these targeted schemes have found success in enhancing






























utilization and outcomes among these groups. However,
such policies run the risk of alienating the broader popu-
lation, who fund the scheme, and in any case compromise
the principle of UHC.
Therefore, in practice, a major policy focus in moving
toward UHC has been on this key policy question: What
services should be made available and under what
conditions?
The Health Benefits Package
The set of services to be made available can be determined
implicitly or explicitly, but the simple accounting require-
ment means that its total size will be constrained by the avail-
able funds. This may seem obvious, but the disconnect
between the aspirational health plans and actually available
financial and other resources is the single most common fail-
ing of existing benefits plans in low-income countries.13,14
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish the de jure set of
treatments offered in theory (perhaps defined in grandiose
terms such as “all necessary services”) from the de facto set
of treatments actually received by patients, which may be
severely restricted by factors such as budget, infrastructure,
human resources, geographical, cultural, and other con-
straints. In this article we are concerned with how a feasible
set of UHC services can be explicitly defined, to create what
is commonly known as a “health benefits package” (HBP), a
set of services that can be feasibly financed and provided
under the actual circumstances a given country finds itself.15
An important characteristic of the HBP as defined is that it
is made explicit, so that citizens can be made aware of what
services are (and—equally importantly—are not) available
and so that payers may assess resource requirements year to
year. It should then represent an explicit statement of the
services to be made available that secure the maximum value
(however defined) from the limited funds available.
Explicit specification of the HBP undoubtedly creates
practical and political difficulties. For example:
 Countries may lack the analytic and administrative
capacity to set a HBP with any assurance.
 The data necessary to set the HBP may be absent or sub-
ject to serious distortions and bias.
 There may be service delivery constraints that preclude
changing the current pattern of services.
 There may be legal statutes that appear to proscribe any
limits on access to publicly funded services.
 The need to make the HBP explicit may create political
tensions by alienating certain patient or provider interest
groups.
 From a Ministry of Finance perspective, the creation of
explicit entitlements to treatment may create uncertain
budgetary implications that could be resolved if arbi-
trary restrictions on access were imposed.
The importance of such considerations should not be
underestimated. However, an explicit statement of benefits
gives rise to numerous benefits; for example:
 It creates explicit entitlements for patients, whose access
to services might otherwise be largely determined by
clinical professionals, with the consequent potential for
arbitrary variations in access.
 It helps to identify whether funds are being spent wisely
on services that create the maximum benefit for society.
 By specifying the services to be delivered, it facilitates
important resource allocation decisions, such as regional
funding allocations, and other planning functions creat-
ing a precondition for reducing variations in care and
outcomes.
 It facilitates orderly adherence to budget limits, which
might otherwise be attained only though arbitrary
restrictions on access and services.
 It reduces the risk that providers will require informal
payments from patients to secure access to high-value
services.
 The entitlements created empower poor and marginal-
ized groups, who cannot be made aware of any specific
entitlement without an explicit HBP.
 It creates the preconditions for a market in complemen-
tary health insurance for services not covered, with a
number of potential benefits for the health system as a
whole.
The absence of a clear statement of the contents of the
HBP has many inefficient and unethical consequences. For
example, funding (say) local district hospitals with a fixed
budget—but without an explicit statement of the HBP—has
been a widely used resource allocation method in the past.16
It secures strict expenditure control without the need for a
statement of services to be delivered. However, this approach
leaves the choice of who should secure access to services to
the local hospitals and may result in arbitrary decisions as to
who secures that access, with obviously adverse consequen-
ces for inefficiency (poor use of funds) and inequity. Further-
more, it runs the risk that—either explicitly or implicitly—
local providers may seek out informal payments from
patients to secure access, further exacerbating inequities.
Though it is difficult to state unconditionally, progress
toward UHC seems to be better managed with explicit






























specification of the HBP.3 This article documents the pro-
cesses that will be needed to pursue such an objective. Set-
ting an HBP involves hard political choices, balancing the
claims of various patient groupings, localities, and suppliers
of technologies and services.6 However, such allocation deci-
sions will always occur when resources are limited, as they
are in every country of the world, and making these decisions
transparent—and, to the extent possible, based on the best
scientific evidence on effectiveness and costs—is an impor-
tant requirement for mitigating the political difficulties that
arise when setting priorities for UHC.
Compared to their counterparts in high-income settings,
decision makers in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) face especially severe challenges in implementing
systems of UHC. The profound limits to resources available
in LMICs intensify the pressures on priority-setting pro-
cesses. High-income countries have been largely able to
develop the HBP in their health systems over time, being
able to provide a generous package of benefits by incremen-
tally adding new technologies as they emerge and funding
them through regular increases in the health budget as their
economies grew gradually alongside. In contrast, LMICs are
confronted by a huge array of technologies and services that
they cannot possibly fund with existing (or planned) funding
levels. This gives rise to immediate and especially difficult
choices and makes it particularly important that the interven-
tions included in the HBP yield high value, in line with the
health system objectives.
Reliance on donor funds in low-income settings can also
create challenges for setting the HBP. The level of funds
available may fluctuate from year to year,17 complicating the
long-term planning process needed to select a HBP and
move toward UHC. Some aid may have conditions attached
that place restrictions on the diseases and services to be pro-
vided. In the same vein, LMICs may come under pressure to
adopt recommendations by international agencies, even if
those recommendations would not otherwise be a priority or
even cost-effective for their setting.13,14 Such recommenda-
tions therefore preempt use of funds and restrict the size of
the pool available for the remainder of the HBP, potentially
resulting in opportunity costs in the form of disease burden
that might have been averted if the entire budget were allo-
cated jointly with an eye toward maximizing health system
objectives.
Choosing the Health Benefits Package
It is important to recognize that the HBP specification can
take many forms and vary greatly in the level of detail and
specificity. At one extreme it could contain a detailed list of
specific treatments and the criteria under which patients
become entitled to that treatment; for example, clinical indi-
cations or age. At another extreme, the HBP could merely
include a general specification, such as any treatment nor-
mally occurring in a primary care setting. Both of these
extremes give rise to risks: in the first case of unmanageable
complexity and in the second case of vagueness and scope
for provision of unnecessary or inappropriate services. In
practice, the HBP is usually likely to take an intermediate
form; a 2014 analysis found a varying degree of explicitness
and detail in seven Latin American countries, for example.18
We believe that—as far as is feasible—the contents of an
HBP should be selected according to consistent and transpar-
ent criteria that are aligned with a health system’s objectives.
It is perfectly feasible to create an HBP without consistency
or transparency. However, such an approach will always be
vulnerable to criticisms that it unduly favors particular
patient groups, service providers, or health technology indus-
tries. Setting explicit criteria makes it possible to explain the
reasons for adoption or rejection of specific products and
services and can allow health systems to set up agencies with
explicit terms of reference for assessing technologies and
services. These are important approaches for alleviating
some of the political difficulties that can arise when setting
an HBP and help ensure a sustainable transition toward UHC.
Furthermore, setting transparent criteria for assessing
treatments and services allows a proper debate to take place
about the objectives of the health system, how priorities are
to be set, and how performance should be assessed. In short,
it is part of good governance of the health system. The speed
of progress toward UHC will largely be constrained by the
taxes citizens are prepared to make available to fund the
health services in the HBP. Their willingness to contribute to
funding the health system may be strongly influenced by
their confidence that the money will be spent wisely, requir-
ing both efficient and fair choices.12
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK
The principle underlying the selection of the HBP should be
to select services according to the value they offer, in terms
of satisfying social objectives, given the costs of providing
the services. Economists have pursued this principle in the
development of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), which
ranks treatments according to their costs relative to the addi-
tional health benefits they confer. CEA has become widely
used and influential and offers a practical approach to the pri-
ority-setting problem. However, it is by no means the only
possible approach, and individual health systems may choose






























to augment CEA (for example, by including additional equity
objectives) or to replace it with other analytic devices. The
important requirement is that any method should seek to
secure for society the greatest value for money in setting the
contents of the HBP, however value is defined.
The need to target services on the interventions that yield
the highest value will become even more pressing in the
future. Globally, demands on health systems will increase as
life expectancy rises and new technologies emerge. These
developments promise major improvements in welfare for
citizens in the future, but they also will place major responsi-
bilities on governments and their agencies to ensure that the
funds available are spent wisely. This will require reconcil-
ing competing claims from numerous interest groups and is
therefore an intensely political process. The requirements for
that process go far beyond narrow technical concerns of ana-
lytic coherence. It requires consideration of a wide range of
functions that are necessary to ensure the HBP has wide-
spread support and has real impact. We describe those func-
tions in the next section.
Further, the HBP does not exist in isolation. If it is to be
more than a de jure wish list of services, HBP must inform
health system functions such as payment, provision, perfor-
mance measurement, and accountability. If these conditions
are not fulfilled, the HBP will be little more than a tokenistic
process that will have little impact on de facto services that
citizens can use.
An intrinsic characteristic of the transition toward UHC
should be that it is sustainable, meaning that:
 the process of setting the HBP is practical and secures
broad support from providers, politicians, citizens and
other stakeholders.
 the HBP offered can be afforded from available
resources.
 the HBP has a real impact on services received.
 similar (or improved) coverage can be offered over
future periods, given reasonable projections of future
needs, technologies, and resources.
 citizens continue to support the principle of UHC and
are prepared to contribute taxes and other funds to pay
for it.
We consider that any sustainable HBP will have four
attributes that distinguish it from other priority-setting
strategies.
First, an HBP includes a portfolio of multiple services,
rather than single services or categories of services or tech-
nologies. Unlike other priority-setting policy instruments
characterized by discrete analyses that focus on one disease
or one category of technology like medicines, for example,
the design and adjustment of an HBP may (though does not
always) require assessment of the whole set of services cov-
ered when deciding on initial or ongoing inclusions and
exclusions of new or existing services, given the available
budget. The portfolio of services allows for a more integral
costing of the package, a link with budgeting and payment,
and a conceptualization of care from the perspective of the
patients themselves. A portfolio does not mean that discrete
analysis will not be part of the analysis, but for the purposes
of moving toward UHC it is the full complement of services
and products that needs to be considered. This portfolio
approach is crucial because it will reflect the full set of serv-
ices the health system needs to manage—the HBP is not a
program or project; instead, it is the basis on which other
health systems policies and tools are used to deliver and be
accountable for services.
Second, a sustainable HBP portfolio of services will be
properly costed using actuarially informed estimates of sup-
ply and demand, based on realistic projections of current and
future utilization. This requirement is essential and is a char-
acteristic of the more effective HBP seen in countries like
Chile, Colombia,18 Liberia pre-Ebola,19 and Thailand.20 In
contrast, in countries such as Ghana,21,22 Uganda,23 and
Peru,18 the HBP was not linked to resource availability and
budgeting, resulting in fiscal imbalances and likely implicit
rationing.
Third, a sustainable HBP will completely or partially con-
strain the products and services that will be made available
through the publicly funded health system or will serve as a
guarantee that at least the HBP-listed services will be avail-
able. The Chilean HBP, known as Plan AUGE (or Acceso
Universal de Garantıas Explıcitas), is an example of an at-
least HBP, where the set of prioritized services is made avail-
able to the entire population under prespecified cost-effective
clinical guidelines, timeliness standards, and full subsidy. In
Chile, nonprioritized services are still offered but subject to
implicit rationing via waiting lists, service availability, and
other implicit mechanisms. An HBP might also be comple-
mented by a negative list—meaning a list of interventions,
services, and products that will not be publicly funded under
any circumstances. In the past, Colombia used a negative list
alongside a positive list as a strategy to limit outside-of-HBP
special request loopholes for certain medicines and proce-
dures known to be ineffective, for example.
Finally, a sustainable HBP is a living, evolving policy
instrument that should adapt as new evidence and capabilities
emerge. Processes should be in place that lead to a relatively






























consistent and predictable process of inclusions and exclu-
sions over time, and most health systems continue to lack
these kinds of processes.18 Perhaps the best example of why
this is important comes from health systems that did not have
such processes in place; in Mexico, for example, efforts to
set up sound process were subverted by politicians raiding
the “catastrophic benefits fund” to build a new cancer
institute.24
THE TEN CORE ELEMENTS OF SETTING AN HBP
In this section we briefly present ten elements that are indis-
pensable if a coherent and sustainable process for setting the
HBP is to be established, in line with the requirements out-
lined in the previous section. It is important to underline that
there is no single correct way of organizing these functions,
the precise nature and locus of which may vary substantially,
depending on policy choices and the nature of the health sys-
tem. What is important is that structures to undertake the
function are in place, that they operate efficiently and effec-
tively, and that the various functions are aligned according to
the common purpose of setting an HBP that secures the max-
imum value for society.
The functions are illustrated diagrammatically in Fig-
ure 1. There is no suggestion that in practice their operation
will be so neatly sequential. Rather, the ordering is intended
to underline the interdependence of the various functions. In
practice, many functions will occur simultaneously, and there
will be cycling back to preceding functions before later func-
tions are undertaken. Moreover, the purpose of illustrating
the process as a cycle is to highlight the fact that setting the
HBP must be a continuous process, with a requirement for
constant review and refinement as new evidence, new tech-
nologies, and even new preferences emerge. The reason for
describing the inevitably messy process of setting the HBP
as a small number of discrete functions is to aid discussion
and help policy makers examine the effectiveness of the
arrangements in their own health system.
Our description of the HBP elements gives examples from
health systems that are grappling with these issues in the con-
text of difficult resource and other kinds of constraints. It
emphasizes that HBP design is a multistep and dynamic pro-
cess that goes beyond using the evidence to make decisions
about what is to be covered under UHC and thereby seeks to
add value to the literature and guidance in this area. We offer
brief comments on each element.
1. Setting goals and criteria: A first step in the design of
HBP is a simple yet crucial and often forgotten one:
setting clear goals and general criteria for the selection
of disease control priorities and—subsequently—serv-
ices and products within each priority. At core, this
step asks policy makers and politicians to clearly state
the intended impact or use of the HBP. In Argentina,
FIGURE 1. Ten Core Elements of Setting a Health Benefits Package






























for example, the goal was to protect uninsured moth-
ers and their infants from preventable morbidity and
mortality.18 In Vietnam, for example, the existing
HBP—initially set up to reimburse providers—is to
be updated to reflect reduced donor funding for verti-
cal public health programs such as HIV/AIDS as well
as ambitions to scale up insurance coverage.25 In other
countries, the HBP is mainly used to define allowable
reimbursement for medicines (Uruguay) or to regulate
insurers (United States, Colombia). Explicit goal set-
ting is a sine qua non condition to assure coherence in
all subsequent steps and it is the basis for the imple-
mentation of accountability mechanisms that check
whether the HBP responds both on paper and in prac-
tice to what it was originally meant to achieve. Once
goals have been set, defining general (not technical)
criteria for inclusion or exclusion of disease control
priorities and/or services comes next. Here, policy
makers and, in some cases, with appropriate process,
citizen and advocacy groups can set out the list of gen-
eral criteria to guide subsequent technical staff and
analyses. For example, in the recently initiated update
of the HBP in the Dominican Republic, general crite-
ria of geographic and socioeconomic equity, severity,
number of people affected, and other criteria were
agreed on as the basis on which to select disease con-
trol priorities and services for inclusion, whereas non-
prioritized diseases and related interventions would be
rationed implicitly.
2. Operationalizing general criteria and defining meth-
ods for appraisal: After setting clear goals and criteria
but before diving into any specific disease or service
category, a next task—likely for technical staff and
analysts rather than policy makers themselves—is to
operationalize general into specific criteria that can be
utilized in pre-agreed and technically rigorous
appraisal methods so that each disease–service pair is
treated consistently from a methods perspective.
Methods choices are closely related to goals; for
example, if the goal is health maximization, then stan-
dard cost-effectiveness analyses may be selected as
the appraisal method and general equity criteria can
be operationalized into CEA presenting disaggregated
analyses by groups. In Thailand, for example, the
Health Intervention and Technology Assessment Pro-
gram has issued a methods manual that is used as the
routine reference for CEA conducted26 and Chile has
established an algorithm consisting of several explicit
criteria that are used to periodically update the number
of health problems that are covered by its health plan
AUGE (see Giedion et al.18). Whatever method is
selected, methods should meet four key principles:
they should be technically robust and justifiable; be
reflective of social values; be easy to understand; and
have a relatively low cost of implementation.27 Not
every disease–service pair will be analyzed using such
methods, but the idea is to clearly set out defensible
methods choices ex ante that will provide structure for
the appraisal process where it is deemed to be feasible
and necessary via a kind of triage, described next.
3. Choosing the “shape” of the HBP and selecting areas
for further analysis: Given the whole inventory of pos-
sible health services constituting the universe of
potential candidates for inclusion, policy makers must
grapple with how to classify services into different
categories with some kind of rules to define priority
inclusions or exclusions or types of technologies.
These choices will determine the shape of the HBP, or
its structure, language, and granularity, choices that
frequently depend on the planned uses for the HBP
(budgeting, payment, accountability, or otherwise).
Further, policy makers must set priorities for the prior-
ity-setting itself, and determine where to start—some
sort of triage must be used to determine which dis-
ease–service pairs or comparators are priorities for
appraisal and decision or for other approaches that
will meet HBP goals or that can be postponed for
later. A basic decision is whether an HBP is being
developed de novo (from a zero-based scenario) or
whether the HBP includes all services currently being
provided and the priority-setting problem is only
incremental (i.e., deciding on the use of newly avail-
able resources year to year). Whatever the case, for
analysis to add value, it must reduce the decision-rele-
vant uncertainty, where additional information will
make a difference for whether a service is included or
excluded from the HBP. For example, a country like
Vietnam, with a per capita gross domestic product of
5,000 USD per year, might immediately exclude med-
icines not considered cost-effective by health technol-
ogy assessment agencies in much wealthier countries
like the UK, Germany, and France. This kind of infor-
mal benchmarking to exclude is a common first strat-
egy in rationalizing benefits plans and does not
require in-depth appraisal. However, screening inter-
ventions for common noncommunicable diseases
such as diabetes are likely in a gray area—perhaps
cost-effective, perhaps not—with uncertain budget






























impact, not currently provided systematically, and
worthy of further analysis.a Similarly, for countries
setting an HBP within certain disease goals, attention
can be focused on appraising the set of alternate inter-
ventions that will most efficiently reach disease con-
trol goals; this strategy has been undertaken as part of
HIV/AIDS program planning in South Africa using
mathematical programming, for example, and could
potentially be used to set an AIDS-specific HBP.28
Other approaches include polling or consulting policy
makers or stakeholders on key policy questions; in
Thailand, for example, policy questions are nominated
by stakeholder groups (such as “Should the benefits
package include the battery for hearing aids?”) and
used as the basis for deciding which appraisals will be
conducted (Y Teerawattananon and N Trivasivat, per-
sonal communication, July 2015).
4. Collating existing and collecting new evidence: For
those high-priority topics identified as part of an incre-
mental inclusion or exclusion process and decision, a
next step is to systematically collate existing and col-
lect new evidence as input to appraisal. Systematic
reviews, meta-analyses, and literature reviews grading
evidence quality are well-documented and tested strat-
egies for the collation, collection, and analysis of
existing and new evidence as input to the appraisal
itself that will follow methods decisions (step 2; see
GRADE Working Group29). Alternatively, some
countries have called for periodic wholesale HBP
revisions, as in the Dominican Republic example pro-
vided earlier. Here, the collation and collection of evi-
dence is essentially a scan of guidelines and medicine
lists in other countries (even those with very different
resource constraints) and a first-round decision to
include wealthiest-country-in-the-world gold-standard
cost-effective guidelines for priority diseases and
leave any additional evidence gathering and analysis
for a later time. Nonprioritized interventions would
continue to be provided according to implicit
rationing.
5. Undertaking appraisals and budget impact assessment:
Cost-effectiveness analysis has become a widely
accepted approach toward appraising technologies, as
embodied in numerous health technology assessment
agencies worldwide. However, CEA is by no means
universally accepted or feasible. Implemented from
scratch, CEA can require infeasible analytic demands,
and transferability of findings from other health sys-
tems can be questionable. Methods such as meta-
analysis can be used to synthesize results from else-
where, and regional collaboration may be a means of
reducing the analytic burden on single countries. A
frequent criticism of CEA is its failure to address
objectives other than health maximization, and a vari-
ety of more general methods have emerged, although
these can introduce new analytic complexities. Partici-
patory methods such as program budgeting and mar-
ginal analysis are based on similar principles to CEA
but allow greater flexibility and participation of key
stakeholders, although they are demanding in terms of
convening skills and expert facilitation (see Mitton
and Donaldson30). A final key analytic step is to assess
the budget impact of the proposed changes to the HBP
as a whole (not only the part related to the appraisal)
in current and future fiscal years. Here, too, there are
widely accepted methods standards.b The lack of a
robust budget impact analysis of the proposed change
can later lead to a lack of coherence between what is
being promised in the benefits package and the resour-
ces that are allocated to implement it and frequently
compromises sustainability of the HBP.
6. Deliberation on evidence/appraisals: Once appraisals
or proposals are prepared, a next step is to establish a
mechanism that will allow for discussion and deliber-
ation around evidence and appraisals/proposals as an
input to making a recommendation for inclusion or
exclusion (step 7). Though deliberation is more com-
monly applied as part of health technology assessment
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment countries, most notably the UK’s National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s committees
and citizens councils, there are good reasons to con-
sider including a process of deliberation around the
entire portfolio of HBP services and its subsequent
adjustment as well. The information and methods
available to make decisions on what to include or
exclude from the benefits package involve substantial
uncertainty related to limited local information sour-
ces, variable strength of the evidence base, restricted
empirical information on what works and what does
not work, and the strengths and limitations of having
and combining objective criteria. For example, LMIC
more often than not lack solid information on the
effectiveness and costs of treatment in their own con-
text.31 Further, beyond incorporating specific criteria
into the selected methods and appraisal approach,
there are other values or considerations that might be
brought to bear in the selection of services. Under






























many circumstances, stakeholders can agree on a
deliberation process considered fair while acknowl-
edging the uncertainties and constraints that surround
the evidence.
7. Making recommendations, taking decisions: In many
settings, deliberation ends with a recommendation to
policy makers on the individual services or portfolio
of services that are to be included in the HBP either
during its initial design or later adjustment process but
fails to connect the recommendation with decision
making. In an ideal process, there is an obligation to
consider the appraisal and its recommendations in
decision making on whether services are included or
excluded for public subsidy. Such an obligation has
been established in regulation in some countries
(Thailand, Mexico), whereas in others, recommenda-
tions are not binding for budget decision makers (UK,
Colombia). The key issue is to lay out clearly how
appraisals/recommendations will relate to decision-
making bodies and individuals, whether payers or pro-
viders, and there may be a need to first build confi-
dence in the evidence/appraisal before setting up an
explicit connection between recommendations and
decision making. Further, attention should be given to
communicating recommendations and decisions to
policy makers at different levels of government, pro-
viders, and the public.
8. Translating decisions into resource allocation and use:
Decisions emanating from appraisals, budget impact
analysis, and recommendations can be translated into
resource allocation in binding or nonbinding ways,
but some kind of direct influence on resource alloca-
tion—via budgets, fiscal transfers, payment, reim-
bursements, or product procurement—is a necessary
element of an effective HBP. Some health payers are
legally required to consider recommendations in
resource allocation. For example, as established in
regulation, Mexico’s Seguro Popular package
CAUSES (Catalogo Universal de Servicios de Salud)
is the basis for budgeting the payment transferred by
the federal government to state governments for the
provision of CAUSES services.c Similarly, in Colom-
bia and Uruguay, the inclusion of a medication in the
published regulations on HBP is a prerequisite for its
reimbursement or payment by insurers. However, in
the absence of legislation or regulation, there may be
other inducements for budget decision makers and
providers to adopt recommendations. For example,
reimbursement rates for non-included medications
might be set at similar prices to included comparator
medications, to avoid creating incentives for prescrib-
ing of non-HBP medicines. There are also non-finan-
cial strategies to induce adoption of included services,
such as clinical guidelines with peer review and medi-
cal audits. Beyond these hard-wired or inducement
mechanisms to link decisions with resource allocation
and use, there is an ongoing need to adjust HBP for
resources available over time using inflation adjust-
ments, price tracking/benchmarking, and other strate-
gies (see next step).
9. Managing and implementing HBP: Once resources are
allocated, there is an ongoing process of HBP services
implementation via payers and providers doing care
delivery. But in the context of the HBP framing, we
use management and implementation of the HBP to
denote the tasks that the HBP manager must carry out
to continuously update and monitor HBP payment and
services using prescription and utilization data, com-
municate with stakeholder groups on included and
excluded services, resolve disputes, manage exclu-
sions, inform price negotiations with manufacturers
(see Yothasamut et al.32 and Pichon-Riviere et al.33),
prepare financial forecasts and plan needed adjust-
ments, and so on. In essence, implementing the HBP
means assuring that it is delivered in practice, in line
with the goals that were initially set out, and both
financially and institutionally sustainable. In short:
implementation is about assuring the coherence of the
HBP with available resources, policies, and context.
This function or step is often forgotten and without an
institutional home but should lie at the heart of obtain-
ing the value for money for UHC in the context of
limited resources. For example, an analysis of the
coherence between the Mexican benefits package for
its conditional-cash-transfer program and the avail-
ability of the infrastructure and inputs required to
deliver it found that very few health posts actually had
capacity to provide the covered services.18 Similarly,
in Colombia there is no explicit alignment between
the content of the HBP and the clinical practice guide-
lines even though both are developed by the Ministry
of Health.34
10. Reviewing, learning, revising: Based on the manage-
ment and implementation experience, the release of
new technologies in the market, and the emergence of
new evidence on existing services, the HBP process
should be considered continuous and comprised of
learning, adjusting, and starting over. Note that often






























countries do not have any systematic processes in
place to update their benefits packages and a periodic
updating process of benefits packages rarely occurs.18
Chile is an outlier in this context because its norma-
tive framework mandates an update of its HBP every
two years.18 A process for monitoring implementa-
tion—for example, in the form of measuring effective
coverage of services and treatments included in the
HBP—would ideally be considered but is not cur-
rently in place in any country. The constraints to
implementing desirable technologies should be
assessed and—where necessary—appropriate changes
to the health system recommended.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article has presented briefly the complex set of intercon-
nected elements that should ideally be put in place to create a
sustainable HBP. We have argued that the HBP is the corner-
stone of a modern health system that is seeking to make the
transition toward universal health coverage. The exposition
has highlighted the necessary functions that should be
aligned with each other in pursuit of a coherent set of health
system goals. Failure to attend to any of the functions jeop-
ardizes the creation of a sustainable HBP and may put at risk
support for the principle of UHC.
Some sort of cost-effectiveness analysis will often form a
crucial element of the evidence base for the creation of the
HBP. However, explicit consideration of the ten functions
indicates that CEA and other quantitative evidence form
only a part of the entire process. The process also embraces
crucial elements such as political decision making, social
value assessment, stakeholder engagement, and implementa-
tion, which involve quite different skills and mechanisms.
An important aspect of UHC that is rarely given adequate
attention is the quality of services offered within the HBP. If
certain population groups secure access to the included serv-
ices at only low quality levels, the principle of universal cov-
erage is breached. Therefore, we would argue that—for
many services—it will be important to specify explicitly the
level of quality that service users can expect and to monitor
adherence to those quality criteria. Where service capacity is
inadequate, policies will be needed to bring the service up to
the required level. The costs of such implementation issues
should be included in the evidence when deciding whether to
include the service in the HBP. One good example is Chile’s
AUGE guarantees—which describe a set of highly cost-
effective services that will be provided at a given and
budgeted standard of quality and timeliness and that can be
tracked and providers sanctioned for failure to provide under
agreed conditions.35
A persistent theme in the discussion has been the need to
ensure alignment of all the various functions needed to create
and implement an HBP. For example, budgeting processes,
clinical guidelines, and provider inspection regimes should
all be aligned with the HBP. How such alignment is to be
secured will depend on the nature of the health system. A
governmentally organized national health service may try to
secure coherence through direct administrative rules and pro-
cedures. A more decentralized type of system may seek to
set up regulators for which the terms of reference are care-
fully coordinated. In some circumstances, the coordinating
mechanism might be a strong performance measurement sys-
tem that monitors adherence to the principles and contents of
the HBP by all parties.
The creation of the HBP determines what services should
be subsidized by public sources of finance. Although the
costs of those services should be fully considered, the crea-
tion of a publicly funded HBP makes no assumption about
whether they should be provided by public, not-for-profit, or
private providers. The key issue is that the services should be
provided efficiently, in line with intentions, therefore requir-
ing a properly functioning procurement function.
Note also that services excluded from the HBP might
still be provided and used within the health system or at
minimum there should be a policy in place to manage
exceptions. Excluded services might be funded privately
(by out-of-pocket payments or voluntary health insurance)
or by other parties, such as charities or municipalities. By
definition, such services are likely to offer less value for
money than those included in the HBP, but some might
choose to use them nevertheless. This suggests, for exam-
ple, that a properly functioning voluntary health insurance
market, covering services not included in the HBP, might
be an essential complement to the publicly funded HBP.
However, the principle of universality embodied in UHC
requires that the services in the HBP should be provided
to a level of quality that is satisfactory for all potential
users. The publicly funded package should not become a
low quality safety net for those on low incomes. Other
strategies to manage exclusion include the adoption of
implicit rationing and/or fees for nonprioritized services;
partnerships that allow for cofinancing of poorer patients
with pharmaceutical or device firms; or even rationing
according to clinical quality standards. All of these strate-
gies are problematic and politically challenging on differ-
ent levels, but they are all preferable to ad hoc






























approaches. No matter what the strategy employed to
cope with those technologies that have been excluded
from coverage, it is an area that requires specific attention
and planning ex ante.
We have sought to emphasize that the creation of a sus-
tainable HBP requires constant review and revision, as new
evidence emerges, new technologies are developed, and
national circumstances evolve. It should be an ongoing pro-
cess, and an important part of creating the HBP is to put in
place well-governed institutions and processes that ensure
that revisions are implemented in an orderly and coherent
fashion.
Finally, we again underline the need to tailor the HBP pro-
cess to local conditions and local systems. Though we
believe that the ten elements described above will be impor-
tant components of that process in any health system, the
exact form they take, and the institutions involved, are likely
to vary depending on local circumstances. For example, it is
clearly infeasible for low-income systems to emulate the
complex system of regulators and institutions found in (say)
The Netherlands. However, there will be a need for all sys-
tems to ensure that the functions described above are under-
taken satisfactorily, often in the context of the existing set of
institutions found in the country. Failure to do so will make
it hard to set a coherent HBP and may compromise the transi-
tion toward UHC.
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NOTES
[a] For example, in Mexico, cost-effective screening looks
different than cost-effective screening in the UK
because of the early onset of diabetes and relatively
high prevalence of prediabetes in Mexico versus UK.
See Castro-Rıos et al.36
[b] For example, these guidelines for budget impact analy-
sis of health technologies in Ireland. See Health Infor-
mation and Quality Authority.37
[c] However, the accountability on the use of the capitation
payments by state government—that is, how well does
state spending track to the established HBP priorities—
is not well developed and not known in the public
domain.
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